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The French Atomic Energy and Alternative Energies Commission (CEA) employ preventive and detective 
controls, fundamental elements of risk management in the nuclear facilities of the French nuclear sector. Using an 
ago-antagonistic systems (AAS) approach, CEA managers balance two ago-antagonistic (AA) forces (preventive 
and detective controls) that together make an AA couple, to mitigate subcontracting risks. The systemic vision of 
AAS, underpinned by systems thinking, enables managers to consider the collective impact of adjusting either a 
single force or both forces, particularly as action(s) on the couple may rebalance the overall system. This paper 
illustrates how preventive and detective controls meet Bernard-Weil’s eight principal characteristics of AAS. The 
temporal aspect of preventive and detective controls, at the nucleus of the AA model, and their time-sensitive role 
in averting and detecting an event are also discussed.  Examples are provided of how CEA managers mitigate risk 
through AA couples by pursuing forces and considering them collectively in terms of “both /and” rather than 
separately in terms of “either/or”. 
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1. Introduction 
Over the past 50 years, the concept of defence in 
depth has been imperative in nuclear safety and 
has influenced the design and operation of 
nuclear facilities, thereby providing an approach 
to both prevent postulated accidents and mitigate 
their consequences (INSAG, 1996, 1999). 
Specifically, this approach enforces the creation 
of multiple independent barriers or echelons of 
protection to compensate for potential human 
and organizational failures, so not to rely on a 
single level of defence irrespective of its 
robustness. France’s Decree from February 7, 
2012, the general rules for nuclear facilities, 
details the safety framework to be respected by 
nuclear operators.  It promotes the 5 levels of 
defence in depth through the use of access 
controls, physical barriers, redundant and diverse 
key safety functions, and emergency response 
measures. This paper focuses on the first two 
levels of defence in depth: Level 1 addresses the 
prevention of incidents and of abnormal 
operations (hereafter referred to as L1 preventive 
control), while Level 2 focuses on the detection 
of incidents and failures (hereafter referred to as 
L2 detective control). 
This paper proposes the use of an Ago-
antagonistic Systems (AAS) approach to analyze 
and balance L1 preventive and L2 detective 
controls used by the French Alternative Energies 
and Atomic Energy Commission (CEA) in the 
prevention and mitigation of three 
subcontracting risks: (1) the non-application of 
the normative framework (relational risk), (2) 
failure to obtain expected results (performance 
risk) which may lead to (3) a non-compliance of 
regulations yielding adversity with external 
authorities (compliance and regulatory risk) 
(Anderson et al., 2014; Das & Teng, 2000, 
2001). Such risks are exacerbated by the 
organizational distance between two entities of 
the contractor-subcontractor relationship, an 
interaction that represents a mere fraction of the 
risk management system. Our results come from 
two nuclear facilities at the CEA. 
Scholars (Arnold & Wade, 2015; Tosello, et 
al., 2012; Vautier et al., 2018a) have proposed 
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the use of systemic tools to allow managers to 
see the system holistically, taking into account 
the dynamics of the system by focusing on 
dialogical couples and their effects. The AAS 
approach, underpinned by systems thinking, 
combines concepts that have both antagonistic 
(opposite) and agonistic (parallel positive) 
effects on the system (Bernard-Weil, 2002; 
2003). One such ago-antagonistic (AA) couple 
includes the managerial tools of preventive and 
detective nature used in risk management at the 
CEA. The contractor employs detective controls 
to ensure subcontractors use adequate rules, 
policies, and procedures (normative guidelines) 
and also supervises behaviors and results in 
order to maximize performance (Anderson et al., 
2014; Das & Teng, 2000, 2001; Eisenhardt, 
1985; Merchant, 1985; Ouchi, 1979). 
Additionally, preventive controls promote 
shared social values, beliefs, and goals by 
reinforcing and rewarding appropriate behaviors 
amongst members of the two firms, thereby 
averting potential events of the multiple actor 
interactions within the system (Das & Teng, 
2001; Vautier et al., 2018a). 
The following section introduces the research 
constructs surrounding AAS (systems thinking, 
AAS model, and characteristics of AAS).  The 
next section details the implication of these AAS 
on managerial controls (preventive and detective 
controls, and temporal aspect of averting an 
unwanted event). Finally, empirical references of 
AA couples at the CEA are provided.  
2. Constructs of Ago-antagonistic Systems  
2.1. Systems Thinking 
A system is a global unit made up of a “set of 
elements which interact together in a dynamic 
manner and are organized to achieve a specific 
goal” (De Rosnay, 1975, 2014).  
 Systems thinking is a set of synergistic 
analytic skills used to improve the capability of 
identifying and understanding systems, 
predicting their behaviors, and devising 
modifications to them in order to produce 
desired effects (Arnold & Wade, 2015). These 
skills work together and are “methodological 
supports that link knowledge, expertise, and data 
from various disciplines relating to the same 
system” (Garbolino et al., 2019). By connecting 
the units of a system, systems thinking provides 
a holistic vision that unifies a group of variables 
and sheds clarity on the effect of their 
interactions (De Rosnay, 1975, 2014). The 
resultant global template permits elements of the 
system to be acted upon either directly or 
indirectly by changing a parameter in parallel to 
the element. 
Durand (2006) characterizes the systemic 
approach by four characteristics:  
· Elements within a system must interact 
with each other, performing actions on 
certain elements while being subjected to 
actions from other elements.  Elements that 
do not interact are external to the system 
(Garbolino et al., 2019). 
· Elements have irreducible properties (cannot 
be reduced to the sum of their parts) that 
transform depending on the degree of 
agreeability between these elements and on 
their hierarchy within the system (Garbolino 
et al., 2019). Durand, (2006) referred to this 
as comprehensiveness.  
· The organization of the system takes into 
account the structure of the system and its 
operations in attaining a common goal.  
· The system’s complexity can be witnessed 
by its sensitivity to changes in conditions 
and by its adaptability constraints 
(Garbolino et al., 2019). This complexity 
impedes the ability to predict the dynamics 
and evolution of the system (Donnadieu & 
Karsky, 2002). 
These four characteristics of the systemic 
approach highlight the importance of using 
systemic modeling tools such as an AAS in risk 
management; particularly as traditional causal 
analysis tools model events and causal factors 
linearly. As a result, such traditional tools are not 
designed to analyze complex interactions 
between actors, the temporal and spatial gaps 
between these actors or their consequences (Goh 
et al., 2010). Given the importance of the 
interactions between actors (subcontractor-
contractor) and the temporal aspects of L1 
preventive and L2 detective controls, a systems 
thinking approach is extremely pertinent.  
2.2 Ago-antagonistic Systems Model 
The French endocrinologist E. Bernard-Weil 
formalized AAS during his work on adrenal-
post-pituitary interactions and later applied this 
model to successfully solve other endocrine 
disorders (Nunez, 1997). To date, this model 
proposes a more abstract and theoretical 
application to numerous scientific fields 
(Bernard-Weil et al., 1975; Corbel et al., 2007; 
Martinet & Payaud, 2006; Zouaghi & 
Spalanzani, 2009). The term “ago-antagonistic” 
(AA) is composed of two terms: antagonistic 
meaning “opposite effects”; and agonistic 
meaning “parallel positive effects” (Bernard-
Weil, 2002; 2003). The AA approach consists of 
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analyzing couples whose forces have both 
“opposite, antagonistic effects on certain 
receivers of these actions” and “parallel 
positive, agonistic effects on other parts of the 
same receiver”, thereby “taking into account the 
unity to which both sides belong” (Bernard-
Weil, 2002; 2003). 
Our AA model, illustrated in Figure 1, contains 
four components: two forces (x- preventive 
controls, y-detection controls), a regulator 
(CEA) and a receiver (subcontracting risks). 
This systemic vision enables the regulator to 
consider the collective impact of adjusting either 
a single force (x or y) or both forces (x and y), 
particularly as action(s) on the couple may 
rebalance the overall system (Bernard-Weil, 
1999, 2003). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Fig. 1.  Ago-antagonistic Model of risk management 
at the CEA. 
2.3. Characteristics of Ago-antagonistic 
Systems 
AAS can be identified by eight (8) principal 
characteristics (Bernard-Weil, 1975; 1999; 2003; 
Zouaghi & Spalanzani, 2009): The first defines 
an AA couple, whose poles have opposing 
actions on one part of the receiver and actions in 
the same direction on another part of the receiver 
(see Figure 1).  The second denotes AAS as a 
dissipative system, a thermodynamically open 
system defined by Nobel Lauriat Prigogine, 
which describes equilibrium against a standard
or a reproducible ready state. Mathematically 
AAS has two equilibrium states: a physiological 
equilibrium (if the standards are respected) and a 
pathological equilibrium (run on poor standards). 
As a result, equilibrium will oscillate around the 
equilibrium point known as equilibrium constant. 
The third describes an AA network made up of a 
combination of AA elementary couples.  This 
network is organized into competing pressures of 
hierarchy and autonomy, explaining how an 
action on one part of the network can rebalance 
the entire network. The fourth is the concept of 
constituent division whereby one force acts in its 
own interest and simultaneously for the common 
interest of the system. The fifth explains that 
AAS integrates dichotomies, a series of 
properties typically opposing compatibility with 
each other (external-internal; dangers-safety; 
contractor-subcontractor). The sixth proposes 
that AAS have states comparable to pathological 
homeostasis or autonomy, thereby resulting in 
unusual strategies within these complex systems. 
The seventh highlights false AA couples such as 
imbalance and balance, good and evil, which are 
not AA despite their semantic opposition. The 
eighth characteristic indicates that all models 
irrespective of their “universality” require a 
meta-model.  However, the meta-model of the 
AA model is yet to be created or identified.  
3. Implications of Ago-antagonistic Systems 
on managerial controls 
3.1. Preventive and detective controls  
Controls are tools that avert and mitigate errors 
and anomalies. When used correctly, L1 
preventive controls are very effective as they 
anticipate and preclude undesirable behaviors. 
These behaviors can also be identified and 
corrected (but not averted) by L2 detective 
controls. The sequential presence of L1 
preventive and L2 detective controls is dependent 
on numerous parameters described below (see 
Table 1). 
L1 Preventive controls minimize goal 
discrepancies between the receptor 
(subcontractor) and the regulator (contractor) by 
establishing common culture and values.  They 
can be defined as a task that aims to ensure the 
performance of the operating process. This task 
may not result in action directly influencing the 
process and are performed by actors who are 
part of the operating process. These actors, such 
as the facility chief or safety officer, are 
stakeholders in the operating process and are 
entrusted with responsibilities. L1 preventive 
controls take place before and during the task. A 
directory of verbs used to describe L1 preventive 
controls includes: to ensure, to follow, to 
organize, to dispense, to review, to program, and 
to authorize. 
 
Receiver 
Regulator 
Ago-antagonistic 
 Forces (x & y) 
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L2 detective controls enforce rules, policies, 
and procedures by monitoring the behavior of 
the receptor (subcontractor) and by rewarding 
performance. They can be defined as a task that 
aims to detect deviations. This task is performed 
by actors who are not part of the operating 
process at this point in time, but rather these 
actors take an external view of the exploitation 
process in order to have the most objective view 
possible when they check for the presence or 
absence of deviations detective controls take 
place during and after the task. A directory of 
verbs used to describe detective controls 
includes: to verify, to check, to execute, to 
effectuate, and to perform.  
Table 1. Characteristics of L1 preventive controls 
and L2 detective controls 
 
 Preventive 
Control  
Detective 
Control 
Aim: Performance of 
the operating 
process 
Detect deviations 
Task: May not result in 
action directly 
influencing the 
process 
Performed by 
actors not part of 
the operating 
process  
Actors: Internal view 
(part of the 
process) 
Entrusted with 
responsibilities 
External view 
(objective) when 
checking for 
deviations 
Temporality: Prior to & during 
task 
During & after 
task 
3.2. The temporal aspect of averting an event  
Events frequently occur either during or after the 
completion of an activity, as a result of the 
dysfunction that took place during the activity. 
Therefore, the most effective time to control and 
avoid potential events is either prior to the task 
(L1 preventive control) or during the task (L1 
preventive control and/or L2 detective control). 
In contrast, a control that is carried out after the 
task such as an L2 detective control serves to 
verify results but is futile to prevent potential 
events given that such controls often take place 
after the event, therefore are unable to detect and 
correct the actions that set the event in motion. 
Nonetheless, once the event is in motion, such 
L2 detective controls are effective in detecting 
the event (see figure 2 below). 
 
Fig. 2. The temporal aspect of management controls 
used in the prevention of an event  
  
 The temporal aspect of risk management and 
the additional parameters of L1 preventive and 
L2 detective controls, detailed above, are the 
nucleus of this AA model. Specifically, L1 
preventive and L2 detective controls act from an 
antagonistic point of view (crossed actions in 
opposite directions) with regards to when the 
controls take place (before/after the activity) and 
with regards to the actor’s position (internal and 
part of the operating process/ external and not 
part of the operating process). These managerial 
controls also act from an agonistic point of view 
(parallel actions in the same direction) with 
regards to the common regulator (contractor) and 
receptor of the forces (subcontractor) as well as 
their joint aim in safety management of 
decreasing risks, events. 
When analyzing risk management using AAS, 
it is possible to extrapolate many of the 
characteristics presented in section 2.3 and apply 
them to management controls. The first 
characteristic allows us to identify preventive 
and detective control as an AA couple.  The 
second reinforces our intuition that risk 
management is a dissipative system (not static) 
with a set of oscillating equilibrium constants 
(ideal balances between preventive and detection 
control). The third can also be applied to risk 
management, which consists of a network of 
management controls whose actions on one 
couple (by way of preventive and detective 
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controls) may rebalance the network thus 
preventing potential events. The fourth highlights 
the heterogeneity and constituent division of the 
preventive-detective control dynamics. On one 
hand, preventive controls act in their own 
interest (as an independent barrier) to avert 
potential events and focus on an internal view of 
the operating task, while simultaneously 
providing a protection layer to compensate for 
human and organizational failures.  On the other 
hand, detective controls offer their own 
independent external and objective view of the 
operating process and come into force at the 
failure of prevention controls, while concurrently 
working in unison as a protection system to 
maintain safe operations should an event occur. 
The fifth integrates dichotomies present in risk 
management via incompatible elements such as 
subcontractors who may act in their own interest 
(the basis of non-cooperation in relational risk); 
while concurrently conforming to converging 
safety objectives (preventive social control).  
Similarly, the co-operation between 
subcontracting firms when one firm trains 
another while at the same time competing for 
knowledge acquisition and performance. The 
sixth highlights the pathological homeostasis or 
autonomic state of risk management, which 
yields alternative strategies such as multi-layered 
safety barriers that, may seem incompatible with 
traditional business practices that focus on 
benefit-cost ratios. The seventh emphasizes false 
ago-antagonists couples, which are not prevalent 
in risk management. The final characteristic 
describes the need to identify the meta-model of 
risk management.  This model would offer a tool 
to analyze both unwanted (conceived) situations 
as well as unimagined events. Therefore, after 
careful study of the eight characteristics of AAS, 
risk management through L1 preventive and L2 
detective controls is a type of AAS. 
4. Preventive and Detective Controls: An Ago-
antagonistic System - Empirical references of 
Ago-antagonistic Couples at the CEA 
For any single task, multiple types of control can 
be used depending on the type of risk one aims 
to mitigate. Certain tasks such as those 
surrounding Safety & Occupational Safety 
require both actions of prevention & of 
detection. The following provides several 
empirical references of the use of L1 preventive 
and L2 detective controls at two CEA nuclear 
facilities:  
4.1 Example 1 
In order to ensure Health and Occupational 
Safety (H&OS) objectives are being met, the 
CEA carries out three controls: A safety brief 
called “Safety  Minute” to prevent potential 
relational risk and compliance and regulation 
risks that is used before the task (L1 preventive 
control); A safety inspection (L2 detective 
controls) to verify the application of H&OS 
procedures during the task; and once again re-
applies a L1 preventive control in the form of a 
“Safety Minute”, until the next task; thereby, 
reinforcing the L1 preventive controls at the 
beginning and at the end of each task. 
4.2 Example 2 
According to the literature (Anderson et al., 
2014; Eisenhardt, 1985; Hopwood, 1976; 
Merchant, 1985; Ouchi, 1979) results are often 
controlled after the task using L2 detective 
controls to “ensure the subcontractor obtains 
results that comply with their commitments” 
(Moreno Alarcon et al., 2019; 2020), thereby 
mitigating performance risk and compliance 
and regulatory risks. However, the CEA prefers 
to mitigate such risks by using also an L1 
preventive control during the task to “ensure the 
procedures are performed according to the pre-
determined specifications” (Moreno Alarcon et 
al., 2019; 2020). These examples indicate a 
transition in the ratio of controls used, moving 
towards a new balance of risk prevention by 
augmenting Level 1 controls.  
4.3 Example 3 
The co-activity meeting is a type of L1 
preventive control that takes place before any 
activity, to discuss the day’s tasks, elements of 
concern, previous experiences and points to 
consider while performing these tasks. 
Additionally, prior to each (high-risk) activity, 
operational preparation occurs in the form of a 
detailed pre-job briefing meeting, an L1 
preventive control that details the order of 
procedures to be performed and the presence of 
“stop points”. A stop point is a clearly 
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designated “pause moment” during which the 
activity is halted, and the contractor (CEA) is 
called upon to verify the activity and to sign a 
document validating the task (L2 detective 
control); once authorized the subcontractor can 
continue with the activity. During the stop 
points, the contractor is not part of the initial 
operating process and therefore has an external 
objective view while inspecting the activity for 
the presence or absence of deviations.  
At the end of this activity, a debrief of the 
subcontractors known as a “return on 
experience” is conducted to: determine if the 
results were obtained; discuss issues or concerns 
during the manoeuver (completion of the task, 
procedures and documents, equipment or tools, 
planning of the activity); determine points that 
were missed during the pre-job briefing; discuss 
future predicaments to avoid; and propose 
suggestions for this activity in the future. This 
debriefs serves as an L2 detective control from 
which the results will be taken into account the 
next time this activity is programmed. The 
information obtained from the return on 
experience will also be discussed during future 
L1 preventive controls such as future pre-job 
briefings and other operational preparations 
prior to the task. Specifically, this pre-job 
briefing discusses the intended results of the 
activity; the potential risks; the situations prone 
to errors; the alternative scenarios; and permits 
the appropriation of the previous returns on 
experience. 
Conclusion  
Risk management in the French Nuclear Industry 
can be described as a dynamic system with 
complex interactions between diverse 
subsystems including contractor – subcontractor; 
subcontracting risk-management tools, and 
preventive – detective controls amongst many 
others. Using systems thinking to model AA 
forces present in the risk management system, 
allows managers to identify and balance L1 
preventive and L2 detective controls used in risk 
management practices at the CEA. Therefore, it 
would be pertinent in future studies to 
comprehend the balancing mechanisms of the 
detection and prevention controls observed at the 
CEA. Such knowledge would be of service in 
designing an approach that incites managers to 
balance AA tensions between prevention and 
detective controls by learning to identify when 
agonistic-antagonistic unbalances have occurred. 
After analyzing several empirical examples of 
current CEA practices, a hybrid multi-level 
control (Level 1 & 2) synonymous with defence 
in depth strategy can be identified. The hybrid 
control that appears to be most efficient begins 
with an L1 preventive control prior to the task, 
shadowed by an L1 preventive or an L2 detective 
control during the task, and finally followed by a 
L1 preventive control that will take place 
between the end of this activity and the next time 
the same activity is carried out; thereby 
preventing future events.  
In this way, preventive controls serve as both 
the alpha and the omega of risk prevention, 
thereby enforcing the classic safety approach that 
focuses on prevention of barriers and reducing 
the probability of event occurrence. Such 
procedures exist to prevent potential & 
imaginable accidents but overlook inconceivable 
accidents. Therefore, the development of a 
template/tool or meta-model to compare 
accidents would allow a better understanding of 
accidents that occur either because the 
prevention barriers did not function (though the 
event was conceived) or because the prevention 
barriers did not exist (because the accident was 
unimagined and unexpected).  
References 
Anderson, S. W., Christ, M. H., Dekker, H. C., & 
Sedatole, K. L. (2014). The Use of 
Management Controls to Mitigate Risk in 
Strategic Alliances: Field and Survey 
Evidence. Journal of Management Accounting 
Research, 26(1), 1–32.  
Arnold, R. D., & Wade, J. P. (2015). A Definition 
of Systems Thinking: A Systems Approach. 
Procedia Computer Science, 44, 669–678.  
Arrêté du 7 février, 2012. Arrêté du 7 février 2012 
fixant les règles générales relatives aux 
installations nucléaires de base. 
Bernard-Weil, E. (1992). Agonistic Antagonistic 
Systemics: An Introduction To Bilateral — 
and Paradoxically Unilateral — Strategies. 
Kybernetes, 21(4), 47–66.  
Bernard-Weil, E. (1999). La théorie des systèmes 
ago-antagonistes. Le Débat, 106(4), 106.  
Bernard-Weil, E. (2002). Approche des systèmes 
ago-antagonistes. Techniques de l’ingénieur. 
3872 Proceedings of the 29th European Safety and Reliability Conference
L’Entreprise Industrielle, (AG1575), AG1575-
1. 
Bernard-Weil, E. (2003). Ago-antagonistic 
systems. In Quantum mechanics, mathematics, 
cognition and action (pp. 325–348). Springer. 
Bernard-Weil, E. (2003). Theorie et Praxis des 
Systems Ago-antagonistes, 11. 
Bernard-Weil, E., Duvelleroy, M., & Droulez, J. 
(1975). Analogical study of a model for the 
regulation of ago-antagonistic couples. 
Application to adrenal-postpituitary 
interrelationships. Mathematical Biosciences, 
27(3–4), 333–348. 
Corbel, P., Denis, J.-P., & Payaud, M. A. (2007). 
Ago-antagonisme 
positivisme/constructivisme: quelques formes 
de travail épistémique. 
Corbel, P., & Terziovski, M. (2008). 
Organizational excellence, knowledge and the 
theory of the firm: To what extent can we 
build on the Knowledge-Based View of the 
firm? THE THEORIES AND PRACTICES 
OF ORGANIZATION EXCELLENCE: NEW 
PERSPECTIVES, 177. 
Das, T. K., & Teng, B.-S. (2000). A Resource-
Based Theory of Strategic Alliances. Journal 
of Management, 26(1), 31–61.  
Das, T. K., & Teng, B.-S. (2001). Trust, Control, 
and Risk in Strategic Alliances: An Integrated 
Framework. Organization Studies, 22(2), 251–
283.  
De Rosnay, J. (1975). Le macrocosme: vers une 
vision globale. Éditions du Seuil. 
De Rosnay, J. (2014). Le macroscope. Vers une 
vision globale. Le seuil. 
Donnadieu, G., & Karsky, M. (2002). Systemic: 
Think and act in complexity. Liaisons. 
Durand, D. (2006). La systémique (10e éd.). Paris: 
Presses Universitaires de France (PUF). 
Eisenhardt, K. M. (1985). Control: Organizational 
and Economic Approaches. Management 
Science, 31(2), 134–149.  
Garbolino, E., Chéry, J.-P., & Guarnieri, F. 
(2019). The Systemic Approach: Concepts, 
Method and Tools. In F. Guarnieri & E. 
Garbolino (Eds.), Safety Dynamics: 
Evaluating Risk in Complex Industrial 
Systems (pp. 1–30). Cham: Springer 
International Publishing.  
Goh, Y. M., Brown, H., & Spickett, J. (2010). 
Applying systems thinking concepts in the 
analysis of major incidents and safety culture. 
Safety Science, 48(3), 302–309.  
Hopwood, A. G. (1976). Accounting and human 
behavior. Prentice Hall. 
INSAG. (1996). Defence in depth in nuclear 
safety (Safety Reports No. INSAG-10) (p. 33). 
Vienna: International Atomic Energy Agency. 
INSAG. (1999). Basic safety principles for nuclear 
power plants: a report by the International 
Nuclear Safety Advisory Group (75th-
INSAG-3 Rev. 1 ed.). Vienna: International 
Atomic Energy Agency. 
Martinet, A. C., & Payaud, M. A. (2006). 
Absorption d’incertitude, enrichissement des 
stratégies et cadres intermédiaires : une 
modélisation ago-antagoniste. Management 
International Montréal, 10(2), 29–14. 
Merchant, K. A. (1985). Control in business 
organization. Financial Times/Prentice Hall. 
Moreno Alarcon, D. P., Vautier, J.-F., Hernandez, 
G., & Guarnieri, F. (2019, July). Applying 
Safety Leadership and Systems Thinking to 
the Formal and Informal Controls Approach 
Used in Safety and Risk Management Within 
the French Nuclear Sector. In International 
Conference on Applied Human Factors and 
Ergonomics (pp. 481-492). Springer, Cham. 
Moreno Alarcon D.P., Vautier J.F., Hernandez G., 
Guarnieri F. (2020) Applying Safety 
Leadership and Systems Thinking to the 
Formal and Informal Controls Approach Used 
in Safety and Risk Management Within the 
French Nuclear Sector. In: Kantola J., Nazir S. 
(eds) Advances in Human Factors, Business 
Management and Leadership. AHFE 2019. 
Advances in Intelligent Systems and 
Computing, vol 961. Springer, Cham 
Nunez, E. (1997). What are ago-antagonistic 
couples? Their role in normal and pathological 
situations. Therapeutical consequences. 
Psychoneuroendocrinology, 22, S95–S101.  
Ouchi, W. G. (1979). A conceptual framework for 
the design of organizational control 
mechanisms. In C. Emmanuel, D. Otley, & K. 
Merchant (Eds.), Readings in Accounting for 
Management Control (pp. 63–82). Springer 
US.  
Tosello, M., Lévêque, F., Dutillieu, S., Hernandez, 
G., & Vautier, J.-F. (2012). Conditions for the 
successful integration of Human and 
Organizational Factors (HOF) in the nuclear 
safety analysis. Work, 41(Supplement 1), 
2656–2660. 
Vautier, J.-F., Dechy, N., Coye de Brunélis, T., 
Hernandez, G., Launay, R., & Moreno 
Alarcon, D. P. (2018a). Benefits of systems 
thinking for a human and organizational 
factors approach to safety management. 
Environment Systems and Decisions, 38(3), 
353–366. 
Proceedings of the 29th European Safety and Reliability Conference 3873
Vautier, J.-F., Hernandez, G., Sylvestre, C., 
Barnabé, I., Dutillieu, S., Tosello, M., Moreno 
Alarcon, D. P. (2018b). Averting Inadequate 
Formulations During Cause Analysis of 
Unwanted Events. In S. Bagnara, R. Tartaglia, 
S. Albolino, T. Alexander, & Y. Fujita (Eds.), 
Proceedings of the 20th Congress of the 
International Ergonomics Association (IEA 
2018) (pp. 607–612). Springer International 
Publishing. 
Zouaghi, I., & Spalanzani, A. (2009). Supply 
chains: ago-antagonistic systems through co-
opetition game theory lens, 12. 
  
